Seminar Information Economics and Robust Institutions (Prof. dr. Jernej Čopič)

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Oddelek za matematiko UP FAMNIT vabi vse študente in zaposlene, da se udeležijo seminarja Information Economics and Robust Institutions, ki ga bo od aprila do junija izvajal prof. dr. Jernej Čopič (Aix-Marseille School of Economics; Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education – CERGE-EI).

Seminar bo potekal v angleškem jeziku.

Prvi dve srečanji bosta potekali v:

• sredo, 18. 4. 2018 (16.00-18.00), predavalnica: FAMNIT-Muzejski1,
• torek, 24. 4. 2018 (18.00-20.00), predavalnica: FAMNIT-MP1,
• ostali termini v maju in juniju bodo objavljeni v kratkem.

Več informacij najdete na tej povezavi.

Foto vir: http://chopichcode.org

Kratek povzetek seminarja (v angl.):
In this seminar we will be firstly cover some basic concepts of Game Theory, i.e., Nash equilibrium and dominant strategy equilibrium under complete information. Then we will move to the setting of incomplete information and equilibrium concepts suitable for robust analysis, i.e., ex post Nash equilibrium and dominant-strategy equilibrium under incomplete information (strategy proofness). In both of these settings, complete and incomplete information, we will then consider concepts of economic efficiency: Pareto efficiency (classical efficiency) and constrained Pareto efficiency. Next, we will formulate and prove the revelation principle under incomplete information and move to the question of maximally efficient economic institutions.
We will commence with the well-known class of allocation schemes, the so-called Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, which satisfy equilibrium conditions (incentive compatibility) and have seen wide applications in Economics and Computer Science. However, these allocation schemes in general fail some desirable properties: either they may fail to satisfy budgetary constraints or they may fail the requirement that the participation of economic actors is voluntary (individual rationality).
We will thus move on to address the question of existence and maximal possible efficiency of desirable allocation schemes, which along with the equilibrium conditions satisfy all desiderata. We will broach these questions in the following economic settings:
Market settings:

• Auctions
• Double Auctions
• more general market platforms

Non-market settings:

• Public goods
• Voting (time permitting)